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Notes
INDIANHEAD POKER IN THE GRAND JURY
ROOM: PROSECUTORIAL SUPPRESSION OF
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, the grand jury has been insulated from public scrutiny,
shielded by procedural rules that veil its operations and permit secrecy of the
indictment proceeding.' The grand jury is an ex parte criminal proceeding
which can operate to inflict injury without the recipient of its accusations ever
being aware that he was a target. 2 It operates behind closed doors, is unfettered
by procedural or evidentiary rules associated with trial, 3 and arrives at

1. Rule 6(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, with few exceptions, that
the disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury are prohibited. Failure to obey this
mandate is punishable as contempt of court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). Additionally, Rules 6(e)(4)(6) contribute to the secrecy of the proceeding. Rule 6(e)(4) addresses the indictment itself. It
provides:
Sealed Indictments. The federal magistrate to whom an indictment is returned may
direct that the indictment be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been
released pending trial. Thereupon, the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person
shall disclose the return of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and
execution of a warrant or summons.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(4). Rule 6(e)(5) directs that all proceedings affecting the grand jury shall
be held in secret. The Rule states: "Closed Hearings. Subject to any right to an open hearing in
contempt proceedings, the court shall order a hearing on matters affecting a grand jury proceeding
to be closed to the extent necessary to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury."
FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e)(5). Lastly, Rule 6(e)(6) seals all records concerning the grand jury. It
states: "Sealed Records. Records, orders and subpoenas relating to grand jury proceedings shall
be kept under seal to the extent and for such time as is necessary to prevent disclosure of matters
occurring before a grand jury." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(6).
2. Rule 6(d) addresses the concern of who may be present during the grand jury proceeding.
The rule does not include the accused as a permitted member, and the courts have long held that an
accused has no constitutional right to be present or to appear before the grand jury. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 6(d). See United States er rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604, 605-06 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 790 (1944).
3. The Supreme Court has refused to enforce the hearsay rule in grand jury proceedings, stating
that such a result "would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution, in which
laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by technical rules." Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359, 364 (1956). More important than the Court's holding that the rules of trial do not apply in
grand jury proceedings, the Court found that a facially valid indictment cannot be challenged on the
competency or adequacy of the evidence assessed by the grand jury. Id. at 363.
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accusations which are virtually unreviewable. 4 Although the grandjury process
does not afford many protections for the individual alleged to have committed
a crime, the few protections history has witnessed are eroding. Recently
dissolved by this erosion is the mandate that the prosecutor make a fair and
accurate presentation of the evidence for grand jury assessment.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution directs that no
individual can be held to answer for a felony offense unless an indictment or
presentment' is rendered by a grand jury. 6 The Supreme Court has held that
this is not a fundamental right of individuals and, therefore, it is not required by
the Fourteenth Amendment in state criminal proceedings. 7 In the federal
system, however, all serious federal crimes" must be initiated upon a grand jury

4. Generally, indictment errors are discovered, if at all, during trial. Typical challenges to the
indictment occur at that time. When reviewing challenges at this stage in the proceeding, the court
will employ a standard of harmless error. This prevents the petitioner from presenting the merits
of the complaint. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text. The harmless error rule, coupled
with the Costello mandate that an accused cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented
before the grand jury, greatly restricts, if not eliminates, the avenues open to challenge.
5. A presentment is distinguished from an indictment. For example, when the attorney for the
government introduces allegations and evidence against an individual, the grand jury's determination
of probable cause is expressed by an indictment. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 17 (7th ed. 1990). Conversely, a presentment is rendered when the grand jury itself
initiates the process against an individual. The Supreme Court defined the presentment in Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). The Court stated:
If the Grand Jury, of their own knowledge, or the knowledge of any of them, or from
the examination of witnesses, know of any offense committed in the country, for which
no indictment is preferred to them, it is their duty, either to inform the officer, who
prosecutes for the state, of the nature of the offense, and desire that an indictment for
it be laid before them; or, if they do not, or if no such indictment be given them, it is
their duty to give such information of it to the court; stating, without any particular
form, the facts and circumstances which constitute the offense. This is called a
presentment.
Id. at 62. Contemporary federal law permits, however, only the use of the indictment. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 7.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). The Hurado Court held that the fifth
amendment guarantee of prosecution by indictment was not a fundamental right applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirement. Id. at 534-35. However,
although there is no constitutional requirement that the states institute prosecutions by means of an
indictment returned by a grand jury, the states that employ grand juries are not relieved from
complying with the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment in the operation of those juries. Rose
v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 557 n.7 (1979).
8. The Court did not define the line separating serious from petty federal crimes. However,
in Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989), the Court held that for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment, petty crimes were crimes carrying a maximum prison term of less than six
months or crimes in which the defendant cannot demonstrate a clear legislative determination that
the offense in question is serious. Id. at 541-42.
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indictment.'
The grand jury and the indictment proceeding have two judicially
recognized purposes. First, as stated by the Supreme Court in Wood v.
Georgia, the primary function of the grand jury is to protect the innocent

against "hasty, malicious, and oppressive persecution.""

Courts adhering to

this purpose regard the grand jury as a screen between the accuser and the
accused, which functions to filter out unfounded criminal allegations and shield

an individual from a malicious prosecutor.
grand jury's screening function. 3

2

This function is referred to as the

The second purpose of the grand jury is to act as an accusatory body that
determines the existence of probable cause to believe an individual has
committed a crime.' 4 A finding of probable cause is expressed by a corresponding indictment. Typically, when federal courts render a decision that
erodes the protections previously afforded a grand jury target, emphasis is
placed upon this accusatory function.' 5 Because presentation of exculpatory
evidence facilitates the screening function of the grand jury at the cost of the
grand jury's accusatory purpose, conflict and debate abound regarding this issue.

The prevalent trend in the federal courts is to place more emphasis upon the

9. KAMISAR ETrAL., supra note 5, at 914. The Fifth Amendment thus ensures that a federal
charge for a felony offense will not be brought without granting the accused the protection of the
review and acceptance of the charge by the grand jury (as expressed through its issuance of the
indictment).
10. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
11. Id. at 390. The Court also stated that society's interest in the grand jury indictment process
is best served by a "thorough and extensive investigation" which is impartial and disinterested. Id.
at 392. See also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906) ("The most valuable function of the grand
jury [has been] not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between the
prosecutor and the accused . . . ."). When the prosecution suppresses exculpatory evidence, the
grand jury does not have the opportunity to be impartial. Therefore, society's interest in the grand
jury process, by implication, is not served by suppression of exculpatory evidence.
12. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1972); United States v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 619 (N.D. Okla. 1977); United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505 (C.D.
Cal. 1975).
13. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
14. See United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359, 362 (1956).
15. See Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1744; Costello, 350 U.S. at 364; Bank of Nova Scotia v.
United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (holding that the indictment was valid where pervasive
prosecutorial misconduct occurred but did not prejudice the defendant); United States v. Mechanik,
475 U.S. 66 (1986) (applying harmless error review of grand jury abuses discovered during trial);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that presentation of unconstitutionally
seized evidence to a grand jury is not grounds for dismissal of the indictment).
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grand jury's accusatory function than upon the its screening function. 6
Currently, according to United States v. Williams, 7 no duty to present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury can be imposed upon the prosecutor
pursuant to the federal courts use of their supervisory power.'" To date,
Williams is the only case decided by the Supreme Court concerning this issue.
Exclusive philosophies concerning the purpose and function of the grand jury,
along with the practical difficulties of defining the scope and nature of such a
duty,' 9 contribute to the reluctance of the courts to impose a system-wide
obligation upon prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence.'
If a duty is not imposed upon the prosecutor, the grand jury cannot
accurately be informed of the facts of the case, nor can it exist independent from
the government. Failure of the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury misinforms that body of the pertinent facts of the case and causes it
to become an extension of the arm of government. Suppression of exculpatory
evidence can expose an innocent individual to the adverse and irreversible
effects of an indictment and public trial. 2' A grave injustice results, and an

16. See Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1744. The Supreme Court only recognized the grand jury's
accusatory purpose and therefore found that it is sufficient to present only the government's side of
the case in securing an indictment. Id.
17. 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
18. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1746. This does not imply that an ethical duty to present the
evidence does not exist. The Supreme Court merely concluded that the judiciary may not use its
supervisory powers to oblige a duty upon the prosecutor. The Court did not opine the possibility
whether a duty is required by the Constitution as the defendant did not raise the argument. For
explanation of the supervisory power of the court, see infra notes 132-34.
19. For example, how will the courts assess the significance of the contested evidence without
reviewing the quality and sufficiency of other evidence presented to the grand jury, an inquiry
proscribed by Costello? See supra note 3. Should the duty encompass any evidence that creates a
reasonable doubt about the defendant's connection with the crime, or should it be restricted to
evidence which negates a prima facie element of an offense? While most federal courts do not
require the prosecutor to seek out exculpatory evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Ciambrone, 601
F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979), should the prosecutor's duty vicariously extend to government personnel
related to the investigation? See United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(holding that the government's duty extends to evidence of which the government is aware or should
be aware). Finally, the courts must deal with the danger that an overly broad definition of
exculpatory evidence would impose an impossible administrative burden on the government
attorneys, yet an unduly narrow definition may eliminate any practical significance the obligation
was intended to effectuate. See Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal GrandJury and the State
Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MIcH. L. REV. 463, 554
(1980).
20. Arenella, supra note 19, at 553-66.
21. These adverse effects were illustrated in United States v. Filippatos, 307 F. Supp. 564
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). The District Court stated that "there can be no doubt that an indictment by a
grand jury places on a defendant the heavy burdens of expending time, energy, and capital in the
defense of his case and almost certainly of meeting the social opprobrium that shadows him while
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element of unfairness is injected into the federal system, a system that is
supposed to initiate criminal proceedings pursuant to an impartial determination
of probable cause. Absent a duty upon the prosecutor, an individual's fifth
amendment guarantee to a grand jury indictment is abridged.'
The purpose of this Note is to solidify the traditional role of the grand
jury's screening function, introduce a statute which will resolve the inequities
associated with the Williams decision, provide workable definitions of
traditionally ambiguous terms which impede the practicality of imposing the
duty,' and introduce a procedure of implementation which will be consistent
with the existing body of federal law.' In Section II, this Note discusses the
history and rationale associated with an affirmative obligation upon the
prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.' This section
will track the theory of the duty from its inception in the state courts to its
recognition in the federal circuits. Section III will analyze the appellate review
of indictment errors and explain how court decisions and legislative enactments
contribute to the rationale that no duty should be imposed. 6 Specifically, this
section focuses on Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Jenck's Act, and the harmless error doctrine. Section IV will discuss exceptions
to the harmless error review of the indictment procedure and explain the
similarity between the rationales supporting these exceptions and the imposition
of a prosecutorial duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.27
Section V will discuss and criticize the Williams decision and thereby explain the
current state of the law.' Finally, Section VI will propose a legislative rule
placing an affirmative duty on the government to introduce exculpatory evidence
for grand jury assessment and will explain the rationale and ramifications of

under the charge of the indictment." Id. at 565. See also United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807,
817 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the handing up of an indictment will often have a devastating
personal and professional impact [on an individual] that a later dismissal or acquittal can neverundo). These burdens are further evidenced by the large percentage of cases which are disposed of
by guilty pleas. According to a 1966 study, roughly 90% of all defendants convicted of a crime
plead guilty rather than face the harsh effects of a public criminal trial. DONALD J. NEWMAN,
CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (1966). There
is a heightened cause for concern when in reality the greatest pressure to plead guilty is exerted upon
defendants who are actually innocent. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea
Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 60-61 (1968). See also Arnold N. Enker, Perspectiveson Plea
Bargaining,in TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108, 112-14 (1967) (stating that there is need
for concern for innocent defendants who plead guilty to avoid the harshness of trial).
22. See, e.g., infra notes 32, 41-42, 55 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 148-89 and accompanying text.
24. Id.
25. See infra notes 30-66 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 67-99 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 100-22 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 123-47 and accompanying text.
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such a mandate."
II. HISTORY OF THE DUTY TO PRESENT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE

The few protections traditionally provided to a grand jury target have been
slowly dissolved by recent court decisions.' These decisions have sparked a
heated debate focusing on the purpose and function of the grand jury. This
debate is evidenced by the conflict in the various district courts when forced to
rule on issues associated with prosecutorial presentation of evidence in the
indictment process. 3 On one side of this conflict, jurists who emphasize the
grand jury's screening function do so pursuant to the constitutional mandate that
an indictment must be based upon an "independent and informed" finding of
probable cause.32
These authorities conclude that permitting only the
prosecutor's side of the case destroys the grand jury's independence and
misinforms the grand jury of the facts of the case. Conversely, other authorities
argue that the grand jury proceeding is an ex parte determination of probable
cause, not meant to be adversarial,33 and only accusatory in nature.'
Courts
that adhere to this view fear that requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury will have the effect of evolving the grand jury
proceeding into a mini-trial. 33

29. See infra notes 148-88 and accompanying text.
30. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (upholding the validity of an indictment
based on hearsay testimony); Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 946 (1963) (holding that indictment based in part on perjured testimony was valid);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (deciding that the grand jury proceeding is not
susceptible to technical procedural and evidentiary rules of trial, and finding that an indictment
supported by illegally seized evidence was valid); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986)
(holding that grand jury error discovered at trial is harmless).
31. For cases recognizing a duty to present exculpatory evidence, see United States v. Page,
808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Phillips Petroleum, 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977); United States v. Provenzano,
440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 579
(W.D.Tex. 1977). For cases not recognizing such a duty, see United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535
F.2d 508 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976); United States v. Ruyle, 524 F.2d 1133 (6th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
32. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1,
16 (1973) (stating that the fifth amendment guarantee of an indictment issued by a grand jury
"presupposes an investigative body acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge").
33. Y. Hata, 535 F.2d at 512.
34. Calandra,414 U.S. at 343.
35. See United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1744 (1992) ("Requiring the prosecutor
to present exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence would alter the grand jury's historical role,
transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body."); see also United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974). The Calandracase presented the issue of admissibility of illegally seized
evidence into grand jury. The United States Supreme Court stated that the strict procedural and
evidentiary rules associated with trial are not applicable to the grand jury context as the grand jury
is not capable to apply these complex legal rules. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349. Imposition of these
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A. Inception of the Duty to Present Exculpatory Evidence
The first court to recognize and compel the duty to present exculpatory
evidence was the California Court of Appeals. In Johnson v. Superior Court of
California,' the prosecutor suppressed evidence from the grand jury that
contradicted a prima facie element of the charged crime. 7 Recognizing that
the traditional role of the grand jury is to stand as a buffer between an innocent
individual and an overzealous prosecutor,' the court placed an affirmative duty
upon the prosecutor to produce evidence that "tends to negate guilt" to the grand
jury.39 Emphasizing this screening function of the grand jury,4° the court
stressed that the imposition of such a duty enables the grand jury to fulfill its

rules would frustrate and prolong the indictment process to the point that the grand jury proceeding
would become a mini-adversarial trial necessitating litigation of side issues only tangentially related
to the finding of probable cause.
36. Johnson v. Superior Ct. of Calif., Cty. of San Joaquin, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. App.
1974).
37. Johnson, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 742-43. While the defendant Johnson was awaiting sentence
on a prior narcotics charge, he entered into a sentencing bargain with the deputy district attorney.
The deal held that in return for information on narcotics dealers, the district attorney would
recommend that Johnson's sentence be served in a local jail rather than a state facility. Attempting
to receive this information, Johnson accompanied a dealer to a motel where a buy was to occur.
Coincidentally, the police raided the sale and proceeded to arrest Johnson for conspiracy to sell, the
sale of, and transportation of narcotics.
At the preliminary hearing, Johnson disclosed the existence of the agreement with the
prosecutor and testified that his involvement was only in furtherance of that agreement. This
directly contradicted the required mens rea necessary to make out a prima facie case against
Johnson. Ultimately, the magistrate dismissed the charges against Johnson due to insufficiency of
the evidence. The disgruntled district attorney then brought the same charges in front of the grand
jury. However, in presenting the case, the prosecutor suppressed the results of the preliminary
hearing and Johnson's exculpatory testimony. In addition, the prosecutor placed a police officer on
the stand who testified that Johnson refused to make any statements regarding the transaction.
Consequently, the grand jury indicted Johnson on all three charges. (See People v. Uhlemann, 511
P.2d 609 (Cal. 1973) (magistrate's order dismissing felony complaint against petitioner not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense, either by a second complaint or by a grand jury
indictment).) The court found that by withholding Johnson's exculpatory testimony and suppressing
evidence of the bargain between Johnson and the government, the prosecutor had impaired the grand
jury's assessment of probable cause. Johnson, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 742-43.
38. Johnson, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 748. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934). The
Berger Court held that while the prosecution may strike hard blows, they are not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much their duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. Id.
39. This wording is adopted from the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal
Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution and the Defense Function, § 3.6, which states in part:
"The prosecutor should disclose to the Grand Jury any evidence which he knows will tend to negate
guilt."

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 3.6 (1993). See also infra note 160.

40. Johnson v. Superior Ct. of Calif., Cty. of San Joaquin, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740, 747 (1974).
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role as an "independent adjudicator of probable cause."4" In this case, the
prosecutor's twisted presentation of the evidence biased the grand jury against
the defendant and prevented the grand jurors from impartially assessing probable
cause.42 Thus, the court determined that the defendant's fifth amendment due
process rights were violated, and the indictment against the defendant was
dismissed.43
Johnson's case was then considered by the California Supreme Court."
While the California Supreme Court's rationale was similar to the Appellate
Court's evaluation, the court resolved Johnson's case on statutory grounds. The
court held that when the prosecutor is aware of evidence reasonably tending to
negate guilt, section 939.7 of the California Penal Code places a duty upon the
prosecutor to disclose the existence and nature of the evidence, so that the grand
jury may order the evidence produced. 5 Section 939.7 specifically requires
the grand jury to call for evidence, which the grand jury has reason to believe
will explain away the charge." The court's rationale centered on the logic that
because the statute requires the grand jury to call for exculpatory evidence, and
as the grand jury is only aware of the evidence which the prosecutor presents,
then, without a duty upon the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence, the
grand jury will not know what evidence to call for.47 In short, the grand jury
will not call for evidence of which it is kept ignorant. Thus, the prosecutor
violated section 939.7 when he suppressed Johnson's exculpatory testimony and
preliminary hearing results. The court granted relief on statutory, rather than

41.

Id. at 749. The court recognized the role of the grand jury as a shield or screen between

the accused and the arbitrary accusations of the government. The role of the grand jury as this
buffer mandates its independence from government influence. Id. at 748.
42. Manipulation of the evidence prevents an independent evaluation of probable cause and
prevents the grand jury from functioning as a buffer between the accused and arbitrary or oppressive
government accusation in violation of the accused's constitutional guarantees. Id. at 750.
43. Id.
44. Johnson v. Superior Ct. of San Joaquin Cty., 539 P.2d 792 (Cal. 1975).
45. Id. at 796. The language of § 939.7 states:
The Grand Jury is not required to hear evidence for the defendant, but it shall weigh all
the evidence submitted to it, and where it has reason to believe that other evidence
exists within its reach which will explain away the charge, it shall order the evidence

to be produced and for that purpose may require the district attorney to issue process
for the witness.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7 (West 1985) (emphasis added).

46. Various states have provisions which are similar to § 939.7 of the California Penal Code.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-412 (1971); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 190.50 (McKinney
1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 132.320(4) (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-4 (1953).
47. Johnson, 539 P.2d at 796. The court recognized that during an adversarial proceeding, the
prosecutor can rely on the defense attorney to come forward with exculpatory evidence. But because

the grand jury process is an ex pane proceeding, the grand jury and the accused have to rely on the
prosecutor to make this showing. Id.
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upon constitutional, grounds.'

B. Recognition of the Prosecutor'sDuty of Fairnessin Federal Courts
Soon after California recognized the duty to present exculpatory evidence,

several federal courts followed suit. 9 However, since there is no correlative
federal statute to section 939.7, the federal courts had to devise an alternative

rationale to justify imposition of the prosecutorial duty.

Similar to the first

Johnson opinion, this rationale took the form of a due process analysis.

Inc.'

The first federal case to do this was United States v. Phillips Petroleum,
The Phillips court held that suppression of an exculpatory explanation

for incriminating evidence is violative of due process and an abuse of the grand

jury proceeding. 5

Phillips presented the issue of whether a prosecutor is under

a legal and ethical obligation to inform the grand jury of exculpatory testimony
of a witness questioned outside the grand jury room.5 2 In answering this
question, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
first defined the function and purpose of the grand jury. The court regarded the
function of the grand jury as "a protective bulwark standing solidly between the
ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor."5 3 The court reasoned that to
fulfill this function and make an independent and impartial evaluation of

48. Id.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977); United States v. Braniff Airways,
Inc., 428 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tex. 1977); United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505 (C.D. Cal.
1975), afd 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1977).
50. 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977).
51. Phillips, 435 F. Supp. at 621. The district court expressly stated that this was a factspecific holding, based on the totality of the circumstances, and the court did not consider the
question of whether in every case in which the prosecutor obtains exculpatory evidence, he is under
an obligation to present it to the grand jury. Id.
52. The defendant in Phillips was indicted for filing false tax returns. Id. at 612. The
prosecutor presented exculpatory and explanatory evidence outside the presence of the grand jury
members. Id. at 612-13. This scheme enabled the evidence to become part of the record while not
being susceptible to grand jury consideration. Id. at 613.
At the close of a day of questioning, the special attorney for the government excused the
grand jury members for the evening and requested that the witness who was currently testifying
reappear "for just a short period in the morning." Id. at 615. However, rather than eliciting the
witness's statements the next day, the prosecutor recorded the testimony later that evening after the
grand jury members had gone. The substance of the witness's statements were exculpatory in nature
and explanatory of previous conduct of the defendant. While the witness's evening statements were
made part of the grand jury transcript, the statements were never disclosed to the grand jurors. Id.
at 615-16.
53. Phillips, 435 F. Supp. at 621 (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1962)).
This is similar to the buffer and shield function analyzed by the appellate court in Johnson. See
Johnson v. Superior Ct. of Calif., Cty. of San Joaquin, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
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probable cause as required by the Constitution, the grand jury was entitled to the
exculpatory testimony.' Because the prosecutor withheld this testimony, he
prevented the grand jury from performing its historic role and thereby violated
the defendant's fifth amendment due process right.55
Although the decision in Phillipsadded a layer of protection to an accused's
constitutional rights in a grand jury proceeding, the case did very little in terms
of specifying the extent of the prosecutorial duty or what standard should be
used to determine the exculpatory nature of the evidence. Some clarification of
these ambiguities was offered by the subsequent rationale in United States v.
Provenzano.' Prefacing the holding in Provenzano, the court reiterated a
well-established United States Supreme Court mandate that the fifth amendment
guarantee to indictment by grand jury "presupposes an investigative body acting
independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge." 57 The Provenzano
court then held that where the government is aware or should be aware of
exculpatory evidence, and the government fails to present that evidence to the
grand jury, the government deprives that body of the opportunity to make an
independent evaluation of probable cause.' As such, this results in an abuse

54. United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 619 (N.D. Okla. 1877). The
district court's finding is consistent with the United States District Court for the Central District of
California's ruling in United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505 (C.D. Cal. 1975). InDeMarco,
the court held that the grand jury was entitled to be apprised of exculpatory information so that it
could make an independent judgment as to whether it was appropriate to return an indictment under
the circumstances. Id. at 513.
55. The court quoted the language and rationale verbatim from the first Johnson decision, and
in that rationale, formulated their due process analysis.
The grand jury's ability to safeguard accused persons against felony charges which it
believes unfounded is an attribute of due process of the law inherent in the grand jury
proceeding, this attribute exists for the protection of persons accused of a crime which
is to say that it is a "constitutional right;" any prosecutorial manipulation which
substantially impairs the grand jury's ability to reject charges which it may believe
unfounded is an invasion of the defendant's constitutional right . . . . When the
prosecutor manipulates the array of evidence to the point of depriving the grand jury of
independence and impartiality, the courts should not hesitate to vindicate the demands
of due process.
Phillips, 435 F. Supp. at 621 (citing Johnson v. Superior Ct. of Calif., Cty. of San Joaquin, 113
Cal. Rptr. 740, 749-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)).
56. 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Pursuant to a Brady request (discussed infra note 67),
Provenzano's attorney received a letter from the government's key witness in which the witness
recanted his prior incriminating identification of Provenzano. However, rather than allowing the
witness to testify in front of the grand jury, the prosecutor entered into the record the previous 22month-old recanted identification of Provenzano. Id. at 563, 565.
57. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. at 564 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16
(1973)).
58. Id. at 565 (emphasis added). By employing this objective awareness standard, the court
fails to recognize the government's argument that it acted in good faith or failed to realize the
exculpatory nature of the evidence.
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59
of the grand jury and a violation of due process.

The Provenzano decision departs from earlier cases in using an objective
inquiry into the intent or culpability of the prosecutor's failure to present
exculpatory evidence. To obtain relief under Johnson, the accused would have
to establish an intentional suppression of evidence by the prosecutor.'
Presumably, this would entail a subjective analysis to determine the actual intent
or culpability of the prosecutor. This leads to the logical conclusion that the
accused could not have the indictment dismissed if the prosecutor asserts that the
failure to present the exculpatory evidence was the result of a good-faith
mistake. Likewise, the Phillips court employed a subjective inquiry into the
Thus, regardless of how unfair or tainted the
prosecutorial intent."
presentation of evidence was, relief in these cases could not be obtained absent
a showing of intentional suppression of evidence by the prosecutor.
Unlike the analyses and holdings of previous cases, Provenzano employs
an objective inquiry and enables relief by showing actual awareness or disregard
for the evidence within the prosecutor's possession or control.62 Unfortunately,
Provenzano did not consider what evidence should be considered exculpatory
and thereby left uncertain the extent of the prosecutor's duty. However, this
case at least defined a standard to be employed by the reviewing courts faced
with a challenge to the fairness of the indictment proceeding. In addition,
Provenzano relieved some of the burden shouldered by an accused attempting
to dismiss an indictment obtained unfairly and prejudicially; it is easier to
demonstrate the existence of exculpatory evidence within the government's
possession or control than it is to prove the evidence was intentionally
suppressed.
Though the accused has a constitutional right to an independent grand jury
evaluation of her case, and even though the prosecutor's one-sided presentation

59. Id. at 566. The court cites the holding in Phillips to support the due process and grand jury
abuse rationale for dismissal of the indictment.
60. Johnson v. Superior Ct. of Calif., Cty. of San Joaquin, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740, 749 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1974). Johnson stated that the accused's constitutional rights are violated when the grand
jury's independence is eliminated due to "prosecutorial manipulation." Id. The facts of the case
indicate that this manipulation is intentional. The court's imposition of the duty is premised on the
idea of unfairness and the bad faith of the prosecutor. For a discussion of this premise, see id. at
748-49.
61. The standard the court used to impose the duty is not stated in the opinion. However, the
facts of this case indicate an intentional suppression of the exculpatory evidence. The court
emphasized that its decision was case specific and applicable only to the fact scenario under
consideration. Therefore, this case must be interpreted as one employing the intentional, subjective
standard.
62. United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561, 565 (S.D.N.Y 1977) (emphasis added).
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of the evidence logically eliminates the independence of the grand jury,' 3 most
courts are unwilling to impose a duty on the prosecutor to present exculpatory
evidence for grand jury review.' This reluctance may stem from the failure
of the courts to specify and resolve the ambiguities of such a doctrine. For
example, if the duty is realized, what evidence should be considered
exculpatory? To what extent must the prosecutor present the evidence? Can the
accused seek remedy after the trial begins? What remedy should be prescribed?
What standard of error should be used?' These questions, unanswered by the
courts, prevent the duty from being required and implemented.' This Note
resolves these ambiguities.
III. PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES AND BURDENS FACING THE ACCUSED
Assuming the preceding ambiguities and reservations are excised and an
obligation is imposed upon the government to present exculpatory evidence to
the grand jury, there are three procedural obstacles which would impede the
defendant's ability to receive relief from an indictment rendered by a biased and
misinformed grand jury. Namely, these obstacles are Rule 6 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Jenck's Act, and Mechanik's harmless error
doctrine.
A. Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 6 of the Federal Rules is the general rule governing the grand jury
indictment process.67 Rule 6 proscribes disclosure of any matters occurring

63. See Johnson, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 749-50.
64. See United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992), discussed infra notes 123-47 and
accompanying text.
65. Presently, appellate courts use the harmless error standard when considering challenges to
an indictment's validity raised after commencement of the trial. See infra notes 87-91 and
accompanying text.
66. See Arenella, supra note 19, at 553.
67. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. The following portions of Rule 6 will be relevant to the analysis of
the obstacles facing an accused seeking to dismiss an indictment for the prosecutor's failure to
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury:
Rule 6(d) Who May Be Present.
Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, interpreters when needed
and, for the purpose of taking the evidence, a stenographer or operator of a recording
device may be present while the grand jury is in session, but no person other than the
jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting.
(e) Recording And Disclosure of Proceedings.
(1) Recording of Proceedings. All proceedings, except when the grand jury is
deliberating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by an electronic recording
device. An unintentional failure of any recording to reproduce all or any portion of a
proceeding shall not affect the validity of the prosecution. The recording or reporter's
notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall remain in the custody or control of the
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This is not an

absolute rule as disclosure can be made to the prosecuting attorney' and
government personnel assisting the prosecutor.' However, Rule 6 presents a

attorney for the government unless otherwise ordered by the court in a particular case.
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator
of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the
government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of
this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as
otherwise provided in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any
person except in accordance with this rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be
punished as a contempt of court.
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror,
may be made to(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance
of such attorney's duty; and,
(ii) such government personnel (including personnel of a state
or subdivision of a state) as are deemed necessary by an
attorney for the government to assist an attorney for the
government on the performance of such attorney's duty to
enforce federal criminal law.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury may also be made(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in
connection with a judicial proceeding;
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant,
upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss
the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand
jury;
(iii) when the disclosure is made by an attorney for the
government to another federal grand jury; or,
(iv) when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for
the government, upon a showing that such matters may disclose
a violation of state criminal law, to an appropriate official of a
state for the purpose of enforcing such law.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)-(e) (West 1985).
In addition to Rule 6, the Federal Rule governing discovery and disclosure of evidence places
no obligation upon the prosecutor to disclose statements made by the government witnesses or
prospective witnesses to the defendant. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. The Supreme Court, in Brady v.
Maryland, partially circumvented this rule when it imposed a duty upon the government to disclose
exculpatory evidence in the government's possession or control to the defendant upon request.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). This is an objective obligation which does not take
into account the good or bad faith of the prosecutor, similar to Provenzano. However, prior
exculpatory statements by witnesses are exempted from the pretrial discovery mandate and need only
be disclosed to the defendant in time for use at trial. United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283
(6th Cir. 1988).
68. FED. R. CrIM. P. 6(e)(2).
69. FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i).
70. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii).
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significant obstacle to the criminal defendant who believes the prosecutor has
failed to present exculpatory evidence, because it generally does not allow
disclosure of the grand jury transcripts to the accused. 7' An accused who is
not permitted to inspect the grand jury minutes or attend the indictment
proceeding itself, has little, if any, chance of discovering prosecutorial failure
to present exculpatory evidence.
Various rationalizations have been offered to justify the protection of the
grand jury minutes. For example, the Court in Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops
Northwest' justified Rule 6(e) by postulating on the chilling effects disclosure
would have on future witnesses who wish to remain anonymous out of fear of
retribution from the accused.'
Additionally, there exists a fear of witness
intimidation or tampering and the possibility that the testimony of the defendant
or defense witnesses might be altered at trial to accommodate the information
contained in the transcripts. 74 It is ironic that in a criminal system that
presumes the innocence of the individual until guilt is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, rules exist which assume that an individual alleged to have
committed a crime is presumed to commit other crimes, such as perjury or
terroristic threats, to conceal his wrongdoing.75
B. The Jenck's Act
This is not to imply that the accused will never come into at least partial
possession of the grand jury transcripts. The Jenck's Act governs a criminal
defendant's right to inspect statements made by witnesses in a federal
prosecution.76 The Act directs that the defendant, upon request, is entitled to

71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(ii). This is not an exhaustive list of exceptions to the general
rule of non-disclosure. For other parties entitled to review of grand jury proceedings, see FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3), supra note 67.
72. 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
73. Id.
74. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Thuh?,
1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 290 n.37; Hon. H. Lee Sarokin & William Zuckerman, Presumed
Innocent? Restrictions on CriminalDiscovery in FederalCourt Belie this Presumption,43 RUTGERs
L. REV. 1089 (1991).
75. See Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 74, at 1089 (stating that limitations on discovery
anticipate that those who are presumed innocent will suborn or commnit perjury).
76. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500 (West 1985). Section 3500(a) states:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report
in the possession of the United States which was made by a government witness or
prospective government witness (other than the defendant) shall be subject to subpoena,
discovery or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial
of the case.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(a) (West 1985). Section 3500(e) defines the word "statement" as:
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or
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a witness's prior statements after that witness has testified at the trial. 77 The
Jenck's Act also applies to the witness's grand jury testimony.' Therefore,
Rule 6 does not apply as a justification for suppression of the witness's
statements after the witness has testified at trial. Although the Jenck's Act was
promulgated to facilitate cross-examination of witnesses and enable the defense
to impeach the prosecution's witnesses,79 it also serves the purpose of revealing
what testimony was brought before the grand jury. Thus, the Jenck's Act
enables the accused to discover the existence of exculpatory testimony possessed
by the prosecutor or within the prosecutor's control at the time of the indictment
proceeding. Depending on the extent and nature of the evidence received, the
accused may make the required showing necessary to receive the grand jury
minutes in toto,' and possibly succeed with a motion to dismiss the
indictment."' However, because disclosure of grand jury testimony is not
required before direct trial testimony, this showing is practically unattainable
prior to trial.' Succeeding on a motion to dismiss the indictment raised during
trial is highly unlikely due to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Mechanik. 3
C. Mechanik and the "Harmless"Error Doctrine
Mechanik presented the issue of what effect a direct violation of grand jury
procedure by the prosecutor should have on an indictment when raised in a

approved by him;

(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof,
which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness and
recorded contemporaneously.with the making of such oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made by
said witness to a grand jury.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(e) (West 1985).
77. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(a) (West 1985).
78. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(e)(3) (West 1985).
79. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 855 (1959). Sarokin and
Zuckerman postulate that Jenck's special treatment is premised on the same fear that justifies other
discovery restrictions: the fear that defendants, if given such information before trial, might commit
perjury by altering defense testimony so as not to conflict with testimony to be given by government
witnesses. Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 74, at 1099.
80. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(ii); see supra note 67.
81. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(6).
82. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 80 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. 475 U.S. 66 (1986). Justice Marshall's dissent supports the contention that the defendant
will most often fail with a motion to dismiss. See also I CHARLES WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 108, at 263-65 (2d ed. 1982).
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timely manner, either during the trial or after a jury verdict has been entered.'
The prosecutor in Mechanik allowed government agents to testify in tandem
before the grand jury, a direct violation of Rule 6(d).' In deciding this case,
the majority held that the petit jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
necessarily includes a finding that there was probable cause to believe that the
defendants committed the charged offenses." Thus, the majority concluded
that any error in the grand jury proceeding "connected with the charging
decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,"81 as measured by the petit
jury's verdict.'
In essence, this ruling was the kiss of death for any defendant hoping to
exercise the right to dismiss an indictment which was unfairly and
unconstitutionally granted. There are two fatal effects the Mechanik decision has
upon criminal defendants.
First, the decision provides judges with a rationale and an incentive to delay
consideration of motions to dismiss until a time when the motion is either
irrelevant or moot. 8' According to Mechanik, when a trial judge is faced with
a motion to dismiss an indictment for either a Rule 6 violation or prosecutorial

84. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 73. The defendants were indicted on drug-related offenses and
conspiracy. During trial, a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent testified for the government.
After the agent's testimony, defense counsel requested disclosure of the agent's prior statements
made to the grand jury pursuant to the Jenck's Act. Disclosure of this material revealed that the
prosecutor permitted the witness to testify in tandem with another DEA agent, a direct violation of
Rule 6(d). The defendants immediately moved for dismissal of the indictment. Rather than making
a contemporaneous ruling on the motion, the trial judge took the motion under advisement, deferring
a decision until after the jury rendered a verdict. Id. at 68.
After the petit jury returned a guilty verdict, the trial judge denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss the indictment. The judge justified his ruling upon finding that the grand jury violation did
not harm or substantially prejudice the defendants as evidenced by the petit jury's finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
85. See supra note 67. The Supreme Court assumed that the simultaneous presence and tandem
testimony by the two government witnesses violated this rule. The Court also stated that the
indictment's dismissal would have been the appropriate remedy upon a showing of actual prejudice
had the challenge been raised prior to commencement of the trial. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 69-70.
86. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70.
87. Rule 52(a) defines harmless error as: "Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
88. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 73 (1986). Justice O'Connor, writing the
concurring opinion, disagreed with using the standard of the petit jury's verdict to determine
harmless error. In her view, the harmless error inquiry should focus on the effect the error had on
the charging decision rather than the verdict. The Court's analysis of the error viewed in the context
of the trial is inconsistent with the federal rules and existing precedent, in that a Rule 6(d) violation
is a grand jury error, not a trial error. Consequently, according to O'Connor, the proper focus
should center on the effect the error had upon the grand jury's charging decision rather than the petit
jury's verdict. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. See Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 83-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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misconduct,' the judge is able to defer ruling on the motion until the jury
renders its verdict. At this point, the issue of grand jury violations is moot
because the harmless error doctrine will be triggered. If the defendant is
acquitted by the verdict, the motion to dismiss is irrelevant. Alternatively, if the
jury finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict subsumes any contention
of an incorrect finding of probable cause and the motion will fail. Thus, by
delaying consideration of the motion, the court gets away with not having to
determine the issue, in addition to reducing its judicial workload. 9 '
Second, not only does Mechanik moot the issue of Rule 6 violations, it also
renders Rule 6 unenforceable.'2 Pursuant to the strictly enforced tradition of
non-disclosure and Rule 6(e) provisions of grand jury secrecy, 9 the defendant
is prevented from examining the minutes of the grand jury prior to trial.' The
Jenck's Act permits access to the material only after the government's witness
has testified at trial.9 Accordingly, if the defendant is to become aware of any
prosecutorial misconduct or grand jury abuse at all, it will not be until the trial
has commenced. A timely motion to dismiss the indictment upon the immediate
time of discovery will be deferred until the jury renders a verdict. As
mentioned earlier, the issue at this point is moot because Mechanik's harmless
error review will be employed. While the majority did limit the Mechanik
holding to cases in which the abuse is discovered after the trial has begun," it
is functionally improbable that any abuse will be discovered beforehand.
Therefore, the harms caused by Rule 6 violations and prosecutorial abuse of the
indictment process are essentially without remedy.
90. Failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury is generally regarded as a facet
of prosecutorial misconduct. See BENNETT GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, §§2.6, 242.1-42.2; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
PROSECTION FUNCTION § 3.6(b) (1980) (see infra note 159 for text); U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-11.334 (1978) (see infra note 160 for text).
91. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall considers the
majority's decision an "invitation" to delay consideration of a motion to dismiss until said motion
is mooted by the verdict. Id.

92. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 80 (1986). Rule 6 violations arise, if at all,
during trial, when § 3500 will trigger disclosure of some grand jury minutes. Once the violation
has been discovered, however, it will be too late to bring a motion to dismiss for, as in Mechanik,
the court will take the motion under advisement until the jury renders its verdict, thereby mooting
the issue. Therefore, as there is no way to discover the violation before the court employs the
harmless error rule, Rule 6 proscriptions are unenforceable.

93. See supra note 67.
94. See supra notes 67, 76.
95. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(a) (West 1985), discussed in supra note 76.

96. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986). "We express no opinion as to what
remedy may be appropriate for a violation of Rule 6(d) that has affected the grand jury's charging
decision and is brought before the commencement of trial." Id. (emphasis added). The Court did
not preclude the possibility of correcting grand jury errors if the errors are substantial and brought

before the trial has commenced. Id.
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Denying the defense remedy in cases of flagrant prosecutorial abuse of
grand jury procedures reduces the laws governing grand jury proceedings to
"pretend rules."' The Mechanik majority justified its finding on the grounds
that the relief requested, reversal of the conviction and reindictment proceedings,
would entail substantial costs to society." However, the majority fails to
recognize the cost to the individuals comprising society, who will end up facing
an ex parte proceeding with no procedural or substantive guidelines, protections,
or remedies.'
Additionally, the majority ignores the deterrent effect that
enforcement of Rule 6 would have on prosecutors forced to retry a criminal case
due to their misconduct; with the large workload already experienced by the
prosecutors, a greater incentive will exist to employ preventative measures to
ensure that an indictment will not be susceptible to a successful motion to
dismiss.

IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE "HARMLESS" ERROR DOCTRINE
Although the Mechanik decision crippled the review of errors occurring in
the grand jury room, it did not completely lay the possibility of review to rest.
A few situations exist where the reviewing court will not apply a harmless error
analysis to a challenge of the indictment's validity. Specifically, these are
situations in which the indictment was handed down by a grand jury
discriminately composed and situations where the indictment is supported by
perjured testimony.
A.

GrandJury Discrimination

In Vasquez v. Hillery,"tu the Supreme Court granted habeas corpus review
of the petitioner's challenge to a state court conviction. The petitioner claimed
he was denied equal protection of the laws because African-Americans were
systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him.''
The

97. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 83 (citing United States v. Borello, 766 F.2d 46, 58 (2d. Cir.
1985)). Justice Marshall also states that prosecutorial misconduct will be punished only by "purely
ceremonial words" of appellate displeasure. Id. (quoting United States v. Anotelli Fireworks Co.,
155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946)).
98. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 69.
99. The Court makes note of the economic expense incurred by the defendant yet makes no
mention of the liberty expense exacted when a defendant is unfairly and unconstitutionally brought
to trial. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 82.
100. 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (decided one month prior to Mechanik).
101. Id. at 257. The defendant was indicted and convicted of a brutal, first-degree murder 24
years prior to the Supreme Court's resolution of the case. Before the trial, defendant Hillery moved
to quash the murder indictment on the grounds that African-Americans were denied the opportunity
to serve as grand jurors. The trial judge denied Hillery's motion and, subsequently, Hillery was
convicted of first-degree murder. The motion was denied because the trial judge personally selected
the grand jurors and could swear absence of any discriminatory intent or motive, previously a prima
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Supreme Court adamantly refused to accept the government's argument that any
prejudice the defendant might have experienced as a consequence of racial
discrimination in the grand jury composition was corrected by the subsequent,
fundamentally fair, jury trial conviction.'
In this case, the Court did not
consider the actual fairness of the trial as a curative remedy of grand jury
defects and abuses. " 3 The Supreme Court refused to apply harmless error
review because it found that an indictment rendered by a grand jury
discriminately composed is a "fundamental flaw"" 4 which "undermines the
structural integrity of the criminal tribunal.""'°
The Court justified its
reversal" °e as an effort to deter prejudicial grand jury proceedings and an

facie element necessary for an equal protection argument. Id. at 619. Throughouthis incarceration,
Hillery sought appellate review and collateral relief challenging his grand jury indictment. See
People v. Hillery, 386 P.2d. 477 (Cal. 1963) (affirming conviction; rejecting discrimination claim);
People v. Hillery, 401 P.2d 382 (Cal. 1965) (on rehearing, rejecting discrimination claim, reversing
sentence), ceri. denied, 386 U.S. 938 (1967); People v. Hillery, 423 P.2d 208 (Cal. 1967) (after
remand, affirming sentence), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1968); In re Hillery, 457 P.2d 565 (Cal.
1969) (original petition for habeas corpus, reversing sentence); People v. Hillery, 519 P.2d 572
(Cal. 1974) (after remand, reducing sentence); In re Hillery, Crim. No. -20424 (Cal. 1978)
(affirming denial of state habeas corpus). In Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, she argued that
federal habeas relief should not be granted in this case as the state courts had a full and fair
opportunity to rule on Hillery's claim of discrimination and found it without merit. Vasquez, 474
U.S. at 266-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 266-67. This was the harmless error argument accepted by the
Mechanik majority. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court ignored the unduly harsh burden
upon the state to retry the defendant 24 years after the original jury trial.
103. Id. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
104. The court found Hillery's situation similar to the circumstances where a defendant is
judged by a jurist having a financial interest in the outcome of the case, where the petit jury is
chosen by improper selection criteria, and where prejudicial pre-trial publicity has pervaded the
context of the trial. See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927). These situations, as Hillery's, call for mandatory reversal because the effect of the error
or violation cannot be measured. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264 (1986). See also Rose
v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (stating that discrimination on the basis of race in selection of
grand jurors strikes at "fundamental values" of our judicial system and denies the defendant equal
protection of the laws).
105. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263-64. The "structural integrity" of the criminal system is called
into question when a constitutional error affects the objectivity and impartiality of individuals
responsible for assessing judgment, either judge, jury, or grand jury. Id.
106. A point of interest in Vasquez is that relief was provided absent any evidence of prejudice
or intentional discrimination, previously a prima facie element for recovery in a discrimination
allegation. By providing relief to the defendant in Vasquez, the Court seems more concerned with
the idea that the grand jury proceeding appear fair rather than the reality that the grand jury
proceeding actually be fair. See also United States v. Seruba, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979
(citing United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1979)) (stating that federal courts have an
institutional interest in preserving and protecting the appearance of fair practice before the grand
jury); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555-56 (1979) (stating that grand jury discrimination
"destroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process").
For cases requiring a finding of discriminatory intent, see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
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incentive to eliminate discrimination throughout the criminal justice system."
Three rationales were provided for the refusal to employ the Mechanik-like
harmless error review. In these rationales, the Court defined three discretionary
judgments of the grand jury that have ramifications on the criminal trial beyond
the preliminary finding of probable cause. First, the Court stated that a fair trial
does not purge grand jury defects because a grand jury, on the basis of identical
facts, can indict on a higher or lesser charge, on single or multiple counts, or
Thus, an error in the grand jury
for a capital or non-capital offense." °
proceeding extends into the criminal trial with regard to the severity and
magnitude of the offense to be adjudicated. Second, even though the facts are
sufficient to support a conviction on a petit jury trial, the grand jury is not
Therefore, defects in the indictment
bound to indict a defendant at all."
proceeding may effect whether or not there is a prosecution altogether." °
Finally, although a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt confirms the
presence of probable cause, the conviction does not cure the defect in the grand
jury, which frames the indictment."' The indictment defines the nature and

(1976).
107. Vasquez, 474 U.S.'at 263-64. Citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979), the Court
concluded that reversal was the only effective remedy for Hillery's situation. 18 U.S.C. § 243 and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibit grand juror discrimination, but suits brought under these statutes are rare
because of the costs involved and because those eligible to bring suit are often ignorant of the
opportunity. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263-64. Therefore, to enforce these statutes, vindicate the
interests of African-Americans in general, and purge the criminal system of this unconstitutional
practice, reversal of cases infected by such racial discrimination is required. Id.
The deterrent effect a dismissal will have upon future actions of the government is another
reason why no other remedy is sufficient. In United States v. Seruba, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979),
the Third Circuit defined the value of dismissal of a conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct in
the grand jury. The Third Circuit realized that "judicial tongue clicking" and verbal reprimands
have little impact on the problem of grand jury abuses. Yet this is the relief when a harmless error
review is employed to resolve issues of prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury. The court stated
that the "only effective way to encourage compliance with these ethical standards, and to protect
defendants from abuse of the Grand Jury process" is by dismissing the indictment. Seruba, 604
F.2d at 817. The prospect or threat of lost cases due to attorney misconduct will also enhance the
overall fairness of the system. Id.
108. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986).
109. See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting).
110. This is similar to the nullification power of petit juries. When a petit jury resolves an
issue in a case, legal or factual, guided by their moral or common sense judgments, rather than the
judge's instructions, the jury has employed its power and right of nullification. See Sparf and
Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 5. CAL. L. REV. 168
(1972). Similarly, the grand jury, guided by their moral or common sense, can refuse to return an
indictment in the face of conclusive facts which independently establish probable cause.
111.Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263.
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magnitude of the criminal trial." 2 If the indictment process is defective, the
ensuing criminal proceeding is similarly defective. Thus, although the Court has
to concede that the petitioner's trial was fundamentally fair, the petitioner's
paramount interest in a fair grand jury determination of probable cause is not
only a right that, if violated, will be remedied upon review, but is also a
prerequisite for a fair criminal trial.
The three rationales supporting the Court's conclusion that a subsequent fair
jury trial does not purge grand jury abuses or defects can easily be applied to
the issue of prosecutorial failure to present exculpatory evidence.
The
prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory evidence taints the grand jury's decision
to indict. It logically follows that, upon such suppression, the entire criminal
proceeding will be tainted. Therefore, it is in the interests of the defendant, the
courts, and the criminal justice system that suppression of exculpatory evidence
is not promoted by allowing the practice to continue.
B. Indictments Supported by Perjury
Similar to the refusal to employ a harmless error analysis in situations like
Vasquez, some district courts refuse to apply the harmless error review in cases
where the prosecutor is aware that an indictment is based in part on perjured
testimony and remains silent.' 3 In these jurisdictions, a duty is placed upon
the prosecutor to notify the court, the grand jury, and the defense counsel of the
existence of perjured testimony.""
For example, in United States v.
Basurto,"5 the Ninth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction on the ground
that the prosecutor's failure to comply with the aforementioned duty violated the
defendant's fifth amendment right of due process." 6 In justifying its holding,
'

112. Id.
113. See United States v. Spillone, 879 F.2d 514, 524 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Adamo,
742 F.2d 927, 939-40 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983); United
States v. Levine, 700 F.2d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158,
171 (D. Md. 1980); United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 1976).
114. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974). This duty is a requirement
of due process and is mandated by the Fifth Amendment, established by the Supreme Court in

Mooney v. Holoran, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), and Napue v. Ilinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (holding that
the defendant's due process right isviolated when the prosecutor isaware of the existence of perjury
and suppresses it).
115. 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974). The Assistant United States Attorney was aware that the
government's key witness committed perjury while testifying before the grandjury. The prosecutor
informed the defense attorney but kept the information from both the court and the grand jury.
116. Basurio, 497 F.2d at 785. In so holding, the court formulated the duty discussed at supra
note 115 and accompanying text. The rationale of the court recognized that the grand jury was
dependent upon the prosecutor to initiate, investigate, and present criminal cases for grand jury
consideration. Id. With this dependency comes power and authority. Correspondingly then, a duty
isplaced upon the prosecutor to reveal instances of perjury when known, and thereby "correct the
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the court quoted Napue v. Illinois,"7 a United States Supreme Court case
deciding the issue of prosecutorial reaction to the existence of perjured
testimony. I8 The Supreme Court stated, "[A] conviction obtained through the
use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the State,
although not
soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it
9
appears.""1
An indictment is a fundamental part of any criminal proceeding, and failure
to correct perjured testimony in front of the grand jury inhibits its assessment
of probable cause. As this inadequate and unfair assessment of probable cause
defines the nature and magnitude of the trial offense," 2 the court determined
21
that reversal of Basurto's conviction was the only fair remedy.'
Perjury is defined as giving false assertions or testimony under oath,"2
and when it is introduced at any stage of the criminal proceeding, it can be
interpreted as a fraud upon the court. If a duty is placed upon the prosecutor
to present exculpatory evidence and attest under oath to the fulfillment of that

cancer of justice that has become apparent to him." Id. The duty to disclose perjured testimony,
however, is only triggered when the testimony relates to a material element in the case and the
prosecutor is notified prior to the attachment of jeopardy.
The Basurto decision was somewhat limited by a later Ninth Circuit case defining the standard
of materiality to be used. In United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1977), the court held
that the duty to disclose is triggered when the perjured testimony is of such nature that it casts
reasonable doubt on the grand jury's finding of probable cause. Bracy, 566 F.2d at 655-56. This
definition of materiality was adopted from the United States Supreme Court case of United States
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Absent such a finding of materiality, harmless error review will
control and a finding will be made that the defendant's fifth amendment rights have not beenviolated
enough to warrant a dismissal of the indictment. Bracy, 566 F.2d at 657.
117. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
118. The perjured testimony in Napue was introduced during trial, not during the indictment
process. The Court's holding, however, stated that the knowing use of false testimony to obtain a
conviction violates due process. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. Clearly, in light of Justice Marshall's
opinion in Vasquez, see supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text, procurement of the indictment
is a necessary step in obtaining a conviction. The Court opined that this principle is implicit in "any
concept of ordered liberty." Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. While Napue dealt with perjury arising
during the trial, the Court's holding extended the due process rationale beyond that narrow scope.
See also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 74 (1967).
119. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269 (emphasis added).
120. See supra notes 108-09.
121. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781,786-87 (9th Cir. 1974). See also supra note 107
(discussing the Vasquez Court's finding that reversal of Hillery's conviction was the only effective
remedy).
122. Under federal law, whoever willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does
not believe to be true in any declaration, verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit is
guilty of perjury. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1621(2) (West 1993) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1746 (West 1992)
(emphasis added).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss4/8

Mastrian: Indainhead Poker in the Grand Jury Room: Prosecutorial Suppressio

1994]

IND1ANHEAD POKER

1399

duty, the prosecutor would commit perjury if an attestation is made but the
exculpatory evidence is not presented. If the prosecutor's attestation is needed
to support any indictment, an indictment containing the false attestation would
be supported by perjury. Consistent with the Basurto line of cases, such an
indictment would be immune from harmless error review and the right of a
defendant to an untainted determination of probable cause could be vindicated.
Vasquez and Basurto support the assertion that although Mechanik's
harmless error analysis is sufficient for some grand jury abuses and errors, it is
not an all-pervasive obstacle which must be conquered to obtain relief from an
unfair or unjust indictment. Moreover, these cases stand for the proposition that
the indictment proceeding cannot be considered separate and distinct from the
criminal trial. As such, errors in the grand jury room have ramifications which
infect the entire criminal adjudication of guilt. Suppression of exculpatory
evidence from the grand jury leads to a possibly erroneous and conclusively
prejudiced determination of probable cause. In light of the aforementioned
cases, the effects of such a suppression cannot be confined to the contours of the
grand jury room, but will alter and pervert the petit trial as well.
V.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Consistent with the current conservative trend to relax the constitutional
rights of defendants in the grand jury room, the United States Supreme Court
failed to impose a duty upon the government to present exculpatory evidence in
an indictment proceeding in United States v. Williams. " This case represents
the latest opportunity for the Court to scrutinize the fairness of the grand jury
indictment process. However, unfortunately for any member of the public who
has to face the grand jury, the decision merely renders the fifth amendment
guarantee of an independent and impartial determination of probable cause a
dead-letter doctrine.
Williams was indicted on seven counts of making false statements to a
federal financial institution." In presenting its case before the grand jury, the
government misrepresented Williams's interest income and suppressed evidence
which directly contradicted an intent to mislead the banks, the necessary mens
rea for the charged offense." z Williams was apprised of the prosecutor's
partial and unfair presentation after reviewing the grand jury minutes prior to

123. 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
124. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1014 (West 1976 & Supp. 1992). Section 1014 prohibits anyone from
making a false statement or report, or willfully overvaluing any land or property for the purpose of
influencing any action of certain federal financial institutions under penalty of a fine not to exceed

$1,000,000.00 or imprisonment up to 30 years, or both.
125. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1738.
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trial. I" He immediately moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the
government failed to fulfill its disclosure obligation.'" The district court
2
granted the motion and the indictment was dismissed without prejudice.'
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the indictment upon review, finding
that the government's behavior "'substantially influenced' the grand jury's
decision to indict or at the very least raised a 'grave doubt that the decision to
indict was free from such substantial influence.'"'"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the sole issue of "whether
a district court may dismiss an otherwise valid indictment because the
government failed to disclose to the grand jury 'substantial exculpatory
evidence' 3 in its possession."13
The Court emphasized two rationales to
support its refusal to impose the duty upon the prosecutor. Nevertheless, these
rationales and the Court's resolution of the issue have adverse ramifications
beyond the scope of whether or not the prosecutor can suppress exculpatory
evidence.
First, the majority concluded that the judiciary is helpless to impose a duty
upon the prosecutor or to provide a remedy for an abuse of the grand jury
process, because issuing such a mandate or remedy would be improper use of

126. Disclosure was permitted by the court following a specific Brady request by Williams's
attorney. This result is rare and deemed "highly unlikely" by Justice Marshall in Mechanik. See
supra note 84 and accompanying text. For explanation of a Brady request, see supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
127. The Tenth Circuit placed an affirmative obligation upon the prosecutor to present
substantial exculpatory evidence in its possession or control discovered in the course of an
investigation. See United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898, 900-03 (10th Cir. 1990). This duty
did not require the prosecutor to search out all evidence favorable to the accused for such a
requirement would be too great a burden for the government. See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d
723, 728 (10th Cir. 1987).
128. Such a remedy enables the government to seek reindictment and prevents an undeserved
windfall for the defendant. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 69 (stating findings of the District Court). The
District Court in the present case found that the suppressed evidence was "relevant to an essential
element of the crime charged and created a reasonable doubt about [respondent's] guilt ... and thus
rendered the Grand Jury's decision to indict gravely suspect." United States v. Williams, 112 S.
Ct. 1735, 1738 (1992) (quoting United States v. Gray, 502 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
129. Williams, 899 F.2d at 903 (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,
263 (1988)). This standard was the standard first articulated by Justice O'Connor in the Mechanik
concurring opinion and employed by the majority, per Justice Kennedy, in Bank of Nova Scotia.
It states: "[D]ismissal of the indictment is appropriate only if it establishes that the violation
substantially influenced the Grand Jury decision to indict or if there is grave doubt that the decision
to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations." Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S.
at 256.
130. See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1987).
131. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737.
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the Court's supervisory power. 3 2 The Court defined the grand jury's
existence as separate and independent from the judicial branch of
government.' 33 Because the courts do not have the power to "formulate
procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or Congress"'3
to entities existing outside the penumbra of the judicial branch, the Supreme
Court concluded the Tenth Circuit exceeded its authority when it provided a
remedy to Williams."'
This rationale disregards the context in which the grand jury exists and the
limitations under which the grand jury operates.
Without the judiciary's

assistance, the grand jury is helpless to perform any investigatory functions or
enforce compliance with any of its requests." 6 The majority supported its
rationale with a litany of one-sided cases in which a remedy was denied to the
petitioner seeking redress from an indictment that was arguably defective. 37
Specifically, the Court quoted United States v. Costello, in which the Court

declined to enforce the hearsay rule in grand jury proceedings, because that

132. Id. at 1746. But see Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (supervisory power
used to reverse a conviction due to invalid indictment procedure); United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d
772 (2d Cir. 1976) (supervisory power exercised to insure uniformity in warnings given to
defendants testifying before the grand jury). The Supreme Court has formulated an independent
doctrine to remedy inequities in the federal criminal court. When the Court employs this doctrine
to decide a case, the Court exercises its "supervisory power." The doctrine was introduced into
criminal jurisprudence in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). In McNabb, the Supreme
Court recognized that "judicial supervision of the administration of justice implies the duty of
establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence." McNabb, 318 U.S.
at 341. This recognition was elaborated in United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983), when
the Court held that federal courts may construct procedural rules not specified in the Constitution
or by Congress, within limits, guided by considerations ofjustice. Hastings, 461 U.S. at 505. See
also Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1656 (1963).
133. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1992). Butsee Falter v. United States,
23 F.2d 420, 425 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 59 (1928) ("[A] grand jury is neither an officer
nor an agent of the United States, but a part of the court.").
134. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1741 (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505
(1983)). The Court concluded that the use of the Court's supervisory power is only proper to
regulate "their own procedure." Because the Court opined that the grand jury has a separate
existence from the judiciary, the Court concluded it is not possible to proscribe rules regulating
grand jury procedure. Id. at 1741. See also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
135. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1742.
136. Id. at 1752 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49
(1959)).
137. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1743 (1992). This litany includes United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974) (noting that an indictment based on improperly
obtained evidence is valid); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966); Lawn v. United States, 355
U.S. 339 (1958); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (holding that evidentiary rules of
admissibility and exclusion are not applicable in grand jury proceeding); Er pane United States, 287
U.S. 241 (1932); United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407 (1920) (noting that double jeopardy
does not bar a grand jury from indicting an accused where a prior grand jury refused to do so).
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"would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution, in which
laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by technical rules."'" However,
Costello and these other supporting cases were not premised on an inability of
the Court to apply its supervisory power. Rather, these cases were justified on
various grounds explaining different reasons why "technical rules" would not be
wise or efficient to employ, not because redress was beyond the scope of the
Supreme Court's constitutional authority."'
The relaxing of technical rules such as hearsay or the exclusionary rule can
be justified by the fact that the enforcement of these rules contributes to
determination of factual guilt or innocence. One of the grand jury's functions
is to determine if a crime was actually committed and, if so, if the accused
probably was the perpetrator."4 These questions focus on the factual guilt of
the suspect. The rules of exclusion and hearsay are in place to enhance the
accuracy of finding legal guilt, not factual guilt.' 4' The determination of legal
guilt is the purpose of the trial court and any interest that the accused has in
enforcement of these technical rules will be realized in that venue. However,
exculpatory evidence is indicative of factual guilt or innocence because it
answers the question of whether or not a crime has been committed, and if the
accused probably committed the offense. Accordingly, because the indictment
proceeding focuses on factual guilt, there is an interest of the accused and the
criminal justice system to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.

138. 112 S. Ct. at 1743.
139. See Costello, 350 U.S. at 359; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 338.
140. KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 5, at 191.
141. The difference between factual and legal guilt and the principles associated with each
determination is sufficiently distinguished by Arenella in Reforming the FederalGrand Jury, supra
note 19. Factual guilt refers to "the substantative criminal law's definition of criminal conduct."
Id. at 476-77. An individual who is factually guilty is one who commits "the proscribed act or

omission with the requisite intent under circumstances that neither excuse or justify that conduct."
Id. at 476. However, in order to determine whether or not an individual is factually guilty, the
criminal process provides certain procedural mechanisms to insure fair resolution of factual issues.
These procedural mechanisms respect individual rights, rules of evidence, and community
participation in resolving the factual guilt questions. Legal guilt refers to the final outcome of
applying the procedural mechanisms to the factual issues. These procedures reduce the states's
ability to detect the factually guilty. For example, the state obtains reliable evidence of an

individual's participation in a crime which establishes conclusively that the individual was factually
guilty. However, because the state employed an unconstitutional technique insecuring the evidence,
the incriminating evidence is not admissible. Thus, if the state's case depends primarily upon the
illegally seized evidence, the factually guilty individual will be adjudged legally innocent. See id.
at 476-77.
The procedural mechanisms used to determine legal guilt are employed during the trial. Issues

of factual guilt are typically screened during the preliminary stages of the trial, such as the grand
jury indictment phase. Exculpatory evidence establishing the absence of a prima facie element of
a crime is an issue of factual guilt. As such, this evidence should be presented during the phase of

factual guilt screening, i.e., the grand jury indictment proceeding.
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The practical consequences of a ruling that the Supreme Court does not
have the power to remedy grand jury abuses and violations not expressly carved
in the Constitution or by Congress are grave. For example, failure to provide
redress for the defendant against the prosecutor who ignores undefined principles
of fairness and justice enables the prosecutor to act with virtual impunity within
the confines of the grand jury room. This effect was neither argued by the
petitioner nor considered by the majority.
In addition to justifying its ruling with assertions of limited authority, the
Supreme Court also rationalized its decision on historical grounds, ruling that
the imposition of a prosecutorial duty would "alter the grand jury's historical
role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body." 42 The
Court supported this rationale with a historical, eighteenth-century explanation
of the logic behind the principle that only the prosecutor's side of the case
should be presented for consideration. 43 Thus, an obligation upon the
prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence within the government's control is
"incompatible with this historical system" of probable cause assessment.' 44
The Court's focus completely disregards the purpose of the grand jury as
a "bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and overzealous
prosecutor." 145 By centering only on the grand jury's accusatory function, the
majority ignored the grand jury's "equally important" and historically
recognized protective role. The majority's narrow definition of the grand jury's
function ensures that the grand jury will lose its independence and will
ultimately become an extension of the prosecutor's arm, a possibility hardly
given adequate consideration.'" The Williams decision will bring about the
dissolution of the fifth amendment
guarantee of an "independent and informed"
47
probable cause assessment.
The Williams Court forewent the opportunity to resolve some of the

142. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1744 (1992).

143. Id. The majority's analysis ignores any case supporting the contention that the grand jury
has the dual role of screening unwarranted prosecutions and determining probable cause. Instead,
the court digresses as far back as 1769 in England to establish support for the rationale that only
incriminating evidence should be presented to the grand jury. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
*300 (1769); 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 157 (1st Am. ed.
Additionally, the majority supports its contention with various early American authority.

COMMENTARIES

1847).

See, e.g., Respublica v. Shaffer, 1 U.S. 236, 1 L. Ed. 116 (Philadelphia Oyer and Teminer 1788);
FRANCIS WHARTON, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 360, 248-49 (8th ed. 1880).
144. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1745.
145. See supra note 11.
146. United States v. Williams, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 1753 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("We
do not protect the integrity and independence of the grand jury by closing our eyes to the countless
forms of prosecutorial misconduct that may occur inside the secrecy of the grand jury room.").
147. See supra notes 32, 42, 55 and accompanying text.
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inequity inherent in the grand jury indictment process. With excuses of
powerlessness and an obsolete historical analysis of the purpose of the grand
jury, the Supreme Court recognized, but did not impose, an obligation on the
government to employ fair and just methods to initiate criminal proceedings.
Fortunately, the Court did not foreclose the issue from legislative resolution.
Accordingly, the following proposal is one method of remedying the harm that
the Williams decision cavalierly disregarded.
VI.

PROPOSED RULE

A. ProposedRule
1. Consistent with the ethical obligations of the attorney for the government and
in recognition of the rights afforded to an individual under the Fifth
Amendment, the government must introduce material evidence in the
government's possession or control that the attorney for the government is aware
or should be aware negates an essential element in the criminal offense.
a. In the event that the grand jury finds probable cause exists to believe a
crime has been committed, the government's attorney must sign an affidavit
attesting to the fulfillment of the obligation to introduce evidence defined
in section 2 of this provision.
b. Failure of the attorney for the government to sign an affidavit attesting
to the fulfillment of the government's obligation to present evidence
encompassed in section 2 of this provision will render the corresponding
indictment procedurally defective and invalid.
(1) A criminal trial may not proceed upon an indictment adjudged to
be procedurally defective and invalid by this enactment.
(2) If it is ascertained before trial or during trial, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3500, a discovery order imposed by the court, or any other
source, that the attorney for the government failed to fulfill the duty
imposed upon the government in this provision, the corresponding
indictment will be considered to have been based upon perjury,
resulting in an invalid, procedurally defective indictment.
(i) An indictment procedurally defective and invalid will be
dismissed without prejudice contemporaneously with a Rule 6
motion to dismiss the indictment.
(ii) A motion to dismiss the indictment will present a question of
law to be determined by the trial judge.
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2. Definitions
a. Material evidence. In the case of the government suppressing,
withholding, or failing to present evidence in its possession or control to the
grand jury, material evidence will be defined as real or testimonial evidence
of which there exists a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
introduced, the grand jury's decision to indict on the criminal charge would
have been different.
b. Reasonable Probability. Reasonable probability, in the context of
material evidence, is to be understood to be a probability sufficient to
undermine the confidence in the outcome.
c. Evidence in the Government's Possession or Control. For purposes of
this section, evidence considered in the possession or control of the
government is evidence assimilated by government personnel associated
with the criminal investigation of the target or evidence which the attorney
for the government is aware or should be aware exists.
B. Explanation of the Proposed Rule
The proposal imposing the obligation upon the government's attorney
injects an element of fairness into the grand jury proceedings. Accordingly, it
is narrowly tailored to that goal and is consistent with pre-Williams schools of
thought concerning the prosecutorial function.'" The Supreme Court defined
the role of the government's attorney when it stated:
[The United States Attorney] is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnest and vigor
...But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one . . . . His interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done.""

148.

See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-THE

PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.6, 90-91; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, tit. 9, ch. 11, § 9-11.233 (1988); United States v. Berger, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935); Provenzano v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Johnson v. Superior Ct.
of Calif., Cty. of San Joaquin, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
149. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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The proposed rule gives effect and bite to the mandate of fairness that is
presently recognized, yet unenforced.
Additionally, this proposal recognizes the significance of the indictment
proceeding identified by the Supreme Court in Vasquez. s The grand jury
determination of probable cause, represented by the corresponding indictment,
defines the nature and magnitude of the criminal offense and the trial process.
Suppression of exculpatory evidence that affects the grand jury's charging
decision infects and distorts the entire criminal process.'
As such, this
proposal is not motivated solely to vindicate an accused's fifth amendment right
to a grand jury determination of probable cause, but also to eradicate an inequity
inherent in the indictment process that weakens the foundation of the criminal
trial.
Further, the proposed rule gives substantive effect to the fifth amendment
guarantee that the assessment of probable cause be made by an investigative
body "acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge."" 2 As
previously discussed, presentation of only incriminating evidence and
suppression of exculpatory evidence causes the grand jury to become an arm of
the government, under whose control indictments are either rendered or
rejected." 3 This destroys the independence of the grand jury's ability to
accurately assess the presence of probable cause to believe a crime has been
committed by the accused.l" Accordingly, this suppression is violative of an
individual's fifth amendment rights. Imposition of the obligation to make a fair
and accurate presentation of the evidence is simply a statutory recognition of the
rights of every individual under the Constitution.
Opponents to this proposal will argue that imposing the duty transforms the
indictment process into an adversarial proceeding.'
However, the reason
the system relies so heavily on the prosecutor to make a fair and accurate
presentation of the case is the fact that the grand jury process is not
adversarial.5 6 In the grand jury room, the prosecutor operates without the
check of the judge or a trained legal adversary who would ensure fairness and
alternative evidentiary showings."57 Where there is no contrary viewpoint to
mitigate partial presentations of evidence, there is no fairness or accuracy of

150. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
152. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1972); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212
(1959); United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
153. See supra notes 54-55.
154. Id.
155. See supra note 35.
156. See Johnson v. Superior Ct. of San Joaquin Cty., 539 P.2d 792, 796 (Cal. 1975).
157. United States v. Seruba, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979).
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result. Therefore, the criminal justice system is dependent on the prosecutor to
further the best interests of society by moderating the indictment process in an
impartial and disinterested manner."'~ The imposition of an obligation to
present exculpatory evidence when it exists ensures that the prosecutor will not
disregard what the criminal system demands.
This proposal is also a statutory affirmation of the duty presently recognized
by the American Bar Association's and the United States Justice
Department."W The standards proposed by these departments have not been
implemented for the same reasons previous attempts to impose a duty were
insufficient: failure to adequately define the scope of "exculpatory evidence"
and failure to suggest a just and reasonable sanction upon discovery of a
violation.'" Imposition of an obligation that defines the scope of the duty too
broadly creates an impossible administrative burden upon the government and
elongates the grand jury proceeding into something that represents a minitrial. 62 If the scope of the duty is defined too narrowly, any injustice

158. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. at 88.
159. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.6(b) (1980) ("[N]o prosecutor should knowingly fail to disclose to the
grand jury evidence which will tend substantially to negate guilt.").
160. See U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-11.334
(1978) (the prosecutor must present substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt of the
accused to the grand jury).
161. Twenty states and the District of Columbia have also attempted to implement rules on
prosecutorial duty of disclosure. A few states and the District of Columbia have recognized that a
duty exists, but they have never defined the scope of the duty. See Adams v. United States, 466
A.2d 439, 445 (D.C. 1983) (implying that the dismissal of an indictment may be appropriate if a
prosecutor withholds exculpatory evidence in "bad faith"); State v. Wendell, 235 N.W.2d 702, 712
(Iowa 1975) (reasoning that dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only if actual prejudice results
from suppression of exculpatory evidence); Hyler v. Sheriff, Clark County, 571 P.2d 114, 116
(Nev. 1977) (implying that NEV. REV. STAT. § 172.145 (1993), which requires grand jury to order
production of exculpatory evidence, creates a prosecutorial duty to disclose). However, most states
that impose a prosecutorial duty require the prosecutor to present to the grand jury evidence that
would exonerate the accused or lead the grand jury to refuse to indict. See, e.g., State v. Coconino
County Super. Ct., 678 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Adams, 645 P.2d 308, 311 (Haw.
1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-11(B) (Michie 1993) (stating that a prosecutor "shall present
evidence that directly negates the guilt of the target when he is aware of such evidence"). This very
narrow scope of the duty however is very difficult to satisfy. See SARA S. BEALE & WILLIAM C.
BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE §6:03, 14 (1986). California is the most liberal in its
realization of the scope of the duty as it requires the prosecutor to present evidence to the grand jury
which "reasonably tend[s] to negate guilt."
See text accompanying notes 37-48. However,
California is the only jurisdiction to employ this liberal standard.
162. See Arenella, supra note 19, at 554. These dangers and the difficulty in implementing
sufficient sanctions upon discovery of a violation prevent prior attempts from being successful. See,

e.g., H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. § 3329(c) (1977) (stating that a comprehensive grand jury
reform bill required prosecutors to "periodically advise the grand jury of the nature and existence
of evidence, as not yet received, which might tend to materially affect the credibility of any witness

or tend to negate the guilt of any prospective defendant"). The standard proposed in this bill is very
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designed to be remedied by imposition of the rule will be eliminated, as any
practical effect of the rule will be lost."e
The definition of the prosecution's obligation and materiality is derived
from previously uncontroverted principles of disclosure and governmental
obligations associated with the context of trial. Primarily, the holdings of Brady
v. Maryland" and United States v. Bagley' 6 contribute to this proposal's
formulation. Brady made it an element of due process and fairness to the
accused that the government could not suppress evidence "material either to guilt
or punishment."'" Imposing this requirement upon the indictment proceeding
is merely recognizing that the indictment process is an important and necessary
part of the criminal trial.
The definition of materiality and reasonable probability is derived from
United States v. Bagley. The Bagley test for materiality is typically applied to
due process challenges for failure of the government to adhere to the
constitutional mandates of discovery. 67 The test provides: "The evidence is
material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. " " Bagley also provided the employed definition of "reasonable

broad, which may impose a harsh administrative burden on the government. Yet this proposal is
silent about sanctions or remedies available upon a violation. S. 1449, 95th Cong, 1st Sess. §
3330(c)(d)3 (1977) would require a district court to dismiss an indictment if the prosecutor "has not
presented to the grand jury all evidence in his or her possession which the attorney knows will tend
to negate the guilt of the person indicted." Here, the sanction is clear but the bill does not
adequately define the scope of the prosecutor's duty.
163. Arenella, supra note 19, at 554. See also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
164. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
165. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
166. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Court stated that due process is violated when the prosecution
suppresses exculpatory evidence material to either guilt or punishment. This due process violation
occurs irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor. Id. In addition to granting relief to
the accused, the Court's ruling was an effort to protect society. The Court stated, "Society wins not
only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration
of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." Id. Applying the analysis to the issue of
the grand jury and the presentation of exculpatory evidence, a duty imposed upon the prosecutor
would not only benefit the innocent defendant, but also society's interest in the fair administration
of justice.
167. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 669. The Bagley decision can be interpreted as an extension of the
aforementioned Brady rule. The Brady Court held that the suppression of evidence favorable to the
accused by the prosecution violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or
punishment. See supra note 168. Bagley clarified this holding by defining the standard to be used
when considering what evidence should be deemed material for Brady purposes.
168. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The Court's definition is a compilation of two standards defined
in earlier cases. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the Court provided a framework
for evaluating the materiality of suppressed evidence or perjured testimony. It held that a conviction
obtained with the use of false or suppressed evidence is invalid if there is any reasonable likelihood
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probability. ""

The proposal's obligation and definitions resolve the problems which arose
when previous attempts to impose the duty were made and at the same time
avoids the dangers associated with an inadequate definition of exculpatory
evidence. The ineptness of the prior attempts to impose a duty upon the
government was due to insufficient definitions of scope and failure to provide
just and reasonable sanctions upon discovery of a violation." The scope of
this proposal is clear: the prosecutor should disclose only evidence within the
possession or control of interested government personnel that negates a prima
facie element of the underlying criminal offense.'
Equally clear is the
sanction implemented upon discovery of a violation: dismissal of the indictment
without prejudice. This is a fair and reasonable remedy, for while it imposes
a sanction upon the prosecutor that acts as a deterrent against future violations,
it does not provide a windfall benefit to an accused who is factually guilty."
The obligation also incorporates the objective standard of determining
prosecutorial failure expressed in Provenzano" and Brady."
The statute
recognizes that the injustice upon the defendant due to the prosecutor's failure,
in the sense that the accused is perhaps brought undeservedly to suffer the
hardships of trial, is the same regardless of whether the prosecutor's suppression

that the contested evidence could have affected the judgment of the jury. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103.
Thus, evidence would be material unless failure to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680.
In a case resolving an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court held a new trial
must be granted when evidence is not introduced because of the incompetence of counsel only if

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). The
holdings, and rationales of these two cases established the standard of materiality used by the Bagley
Court and this note.
169. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). The Bagley Court employed the
definition of "reasonable probability" established in the Strickland decision. The Strickland decision
defined this standard as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of trial. Id.
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

170. See Arenella, supra note 19, at 553-56; see also text accompanying notes 19-20.
171. See § I of Proposed Rule.
172. See § l(b)(2)(i) of Proposed Rule.
173. See supra text accompanying note 62.
174. See supra note 67. The Court held that the suppression of evidence requested by and
favorable to the accused is a violation of due process if the evidence is material to guilt or
punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The Court concluded that such a
violation exists "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor." Id. The Brady Court
focused on the objective value of the evidence in question, rather than the subjective perception of
the prosecutor. Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 74, at 1102.
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was intentional or negligent."5 Accordingly, the objective standard is utilized
to protect the accused from unwarranted criminal allegations and to protect the
system from wasting valuable judicial time in proceeding with unjustified
76
criminal prosecutions.'
The affidavit requirement of the proposal forces the prosecution to attest to
a fair and accurate presentation of the evidence to the grand jury and implies
that the prosecutor did not act to deprive the grand jury of its independence.
This becomes material in the event the prosecutor fails to fulfill the duty. The
affidavit requirement also lends credibility to the fairness of the grand jury
process. To a certain extent, actual fairness rather than an appearance of
fairness is achieved."
The affidavit requirement also provides the rationale
for dismissal. By requiring the prosecutor to expressly aver to a fair and
accurate presentation of evidence, a dismissal of the indictment can confidently
be supported on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct rather than sufficiency or
adequacy of the presented evidence. Accordingly, the Costello preclusion of a
challenge to the sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence supporting the
indictment is not violated."
If the prosecutor does not attest to the fair and accurate presentation of
evidence, the indictment will be invalid. It will not be invalid, however,
because there was not an accurate substantive finding of probable cause; that
could arise by coincidence. The indictment will be invalid because the
procedure the prosecutor used to convince the grand jury that probable cause
existed was improper and unfair. Thus, due to the improper methods used to
secure the indictment, there can be no legally recognizable basis for finding
probable cause, though the coincidental finding of such may be accurate.
The conclusion that an indictment supported by an untruthful affidavit is
invalid incorporates the rationale utilized by the Court in Mooney v.
Holohan" concerning the knowing use of perjury during trial by the

175. "The handing up of an indictment will often have a devastating personal and professional
impact [on an individual] that a later dismissal or acquittal can never undo." United States v.
Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1750 (1992) (Stevens, I., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Serubo,
604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979)). See also supra note 21.
176. United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 728 (10th Cir. 1987).
177. In United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979), the Third Circuit stated that
unchecked prosecutorial discretion in the grand jury room gives the appearance of unfairness. As
the potential for abuse is great and the consequences of an indictment so serious, the court
recognized an obligation of the judiciary to scrutinize the conduct of the prosecutor. This proposal
takes the idea one step further. By imposing an obligation upon the prosecutor to present
exculpatory evidence, the indictment process will not only seem fair, but will actually be fair.
178. See supra note 3.
179. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
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prosecutor. The Mooney Court held that the "presentation of testimony known
to be perjured is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice" and
therefore violates an accused's right of due process under the law.so
Similarly, if the prosecutor avers that a fair and accurate presentation was made
to the grand jury, and it is ascertained during trial that such a presentation was
not made, a fraud is exacted upon the court, the grand jury, and the process.
The result of this fraud will be dismissal of the indictment without prejudice,
because a trial cannot proceed upon an indictment supported by perjury.181
This remedy also sanctions prosecutors who employ unfair and unethical
tactics to secure an indictment. The impetus for the remedy of dismissal was
found in the Third Circuit opinion of United States v. Seruba.tn In deciding
the case, the Third Circuit gave due regard to the costs borne by the government
and the public upon granting relief to a defendant whose grand jury indictment
was infected by prosecutorial abuse."' However, the court determined that
the costs of an indictment process fraught with continued unchecked
prosecutorial misconduct outweighed the costs of an indictment procedure
unaffected by bias or prejudice.'
The court stated that dismissal of the
indictment may be "virtually the only effective way to encourage compliance
with these ethical standards [ABA Standards section 3.5-3.61 and to protect
defendants from abuse of the grand jury process.'
The dismissal remedy not only benefits society by assuring that members
of the public scrutinized by the grand jury will receive a fair and impartial
proceeding, but it also assures that an individual who is factually guilty will not

180. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112.

The Court further stated that the due process requirement

cannot be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the
pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through
a deception on the court. Id. Such a result ensues if the prosecutor supports the indictment with

an untruthful affidavit.
181. See United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that such an
indictment must be dismissed without prejudice (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)). See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
182. 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979).
183. Serubo, 604 F.2d at 817. "We recognize that dismissal of an indictment may impose
important costs upon the prosecution an the public. .
prosecutorial misconduct are also substantial." Id.

. .

But the costs of continued unchecked

184. Id. The court stated that employing a grand jury procedure without a check on
prosecutorial misconduct and abuse entails a negative cost to society. In addition to the public cost,
there is a cost borne by the individual who will experience social and professional opprobrium that
an acquittal or a dismissal cannot undo or resolve. Id.
185. Id.
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receive a windfall benefit due to a prosecutorial or administrative error. '8
Nothing precludes the government from re-indicting an individual on the same
charges contained in a prior indictment dismissed without prejudice. Thus, the
prosecution will get another bite at the same apple, while the defendant will
receive a fair and impartial determination of probable cause. The costs exacted
by this remedy onto the members of society are minimal at best, as society will
share in the rule's equitable results. At the same time, however, the costs
placed upon the government are increased, as they will be forced to proceed
with the inconvenience of a second indictment proceeding. This inconvenience
contributes to the deterrent value inherent in the proposal.
Forcing the judge to make a contemporaneous ruling on a motion to dismiss
the indictment resolves the catch-22 the defendant currently faces when making
the motion during trial. 7 By not permitting the court to defer ruling on the
motion to dismiss until the jury renders a verdict, there is no support for a
conclusion that the prosecutor's conduct was harmless. The Mechanik decision,
which introduced the harmless error review of indictment defects, held only that
such a review will be employed when the indictment is challenged after a verdict
is rendered."s Deferring on a motion to dismiss the indictment until the jury
returns its verdict arose in the facts of Mechanik and was an implication of
Mechanik, but was not mandated by the holding of Mechanik. Thus, Mechanik's
rule of law is not undercut by this proposal.
The decision regarding prosecutorial failure to present exculpatory evidence
to the grand jury will be determined by the trial judge. The issue is procedural
and a question of law that is best adduced by the trial judge. This mitigates the
danger of the injection of prejudice into the proceeding. Further, the issue is
divorced from the merits of the case, as it is a procedural concern and not a
factual one. Redress is then provided for unfair procedure, not the adequacy of
the factual findings of the grand jury. Thus, the question falls outside the
authority of the petit jury who is relegated solely to decide factual matters.
VII. CONCLUSION
The historically recognized purpose of the grand jury is to shield members

186. United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1979). The court thought that
the prospect of cases lost by dismissals because of attorney misconduct would produce a sharp
improvement in the fairness of the indictment proceeding.
187. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text. The defendant has to wait until trial to
discover the grand jury transcripts to determine if the indictment was tainted. A motion to dismiss
the indictment raised during trial will be deferred until the jury returns a verdict. However, after
the verdict has been entered, the defendant's challenge is either moot or irrelevant.
188. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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of society from malicious and oppressive government persecution. 9 In this
regard, the grand jury can be seen as a screen that stands between the accuser
and accused to filter out unfounded criminal allegations and proceedings.
Related to this screening function, the grand jury also performs as an accusatory
body that determines the presence of probable cause that an individual has
committed a crime."9 Generally, the grand jury can perform each of these
roles without conflict. However, issues can arise where the grand jury must
function as a screen or an accuser; for to function as both would leave the issue
unresolved. Presentation of exculpatory evidence to the grand jury by the
prosecutor is just such an issue.
Every individual scrutinized by the grand jury has a fifth amendment right
to have that body independently and impartially assess the existence of probable
cause.' When the prosecuting attorney suppresses exculpatory evidence from
the grand jury, the grand jury's ability to impartially and accurately judge the
essential facts of the case is destroyed." 9 This suppression causes the grand
jury to operate merely as an extension of government rather than a barrier
standing solidly between the government and the individual.'1 9 Accordingly,
suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecutor abrogates an individual's
fifth amendment right and dissolves the fairness of the indictment proceeding.
Nevertheless, an obligation to present such evidence has yet to be imposed by
the judiciary.
As the judicial branch of government has failed to act, the time is ripe for
the legislature to step in and establish a rule to remedy this blatant inequity
inherent in the grand jury proceeding. This Note has attempted to resolve the
ambiguities lending to the reluctance of the courts and Congress to impose a
duty to present exculpatory evidence. Further, it has introduced a procedure of
implementation consistent with the existing body of law to ensure minimal
disruption in the federal criminal system. Imposition of a duty to present
exculpatory evidence will enhance the fairness of the indictment process without
jeopardizing the effectiveness or efficiency of the traditional purposes of the
grand jury. As such, imposition of the duty to present exculpatory evidence
furthers an individual's interest in an accurate assessment of probable cause as
well as society's interest in a fair and equitable criminal justice system.
Patrick F. Mastrian, III

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See
See
See
See
See

supra note 11 and accompanyingtext.
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
supra notes 32, 42, 55 and accompanying text.
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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